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State-on-State security-related tension is on the rise, nowhere more so than 
in cyberspace. A standout miscreant in this regard is Russia, which has med-
dled in elections of its perceived adversaries, including the 2014 Ukrainian 
election,1 2016 U.S. presidential election,2 2017 French presidential election, 
2017 German federal election3 and the 2020 U.S. elections.4 It also report-
edly has implanted dormant malware in U.S. power grids and other critical 
infrastructure that potentially could be targets of hostile cyber operations 
during future conflict5 and was behind the 2017 NotPetya attacks against 
Ukraine that spread globally causing billions in financial losses. Most re-
cently, Russia has been blamed for the SolarWinds operation that spread 
malware across the U.S. government and the private sector. The operation 
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led to calls from senior government officials, including President-elect Joe 
Biden, for a robust response.6 
But Russia is not alone. In 2012, major U.S. banks like Bank of America 
and JPMorgan Chase were the targets of a coordinated Iranian denial-of-
service attack in what U.S. officials believe was retaliation for economic sanc-
tions aimed at halting its nuclear program.7 That year, Iranian hackers con-
ducted destructive computer sabotage against Saudi Arabia’s State oil com-
pany, Saudi Aramco. In 2017, Iran launched a similar cyber operation against 
the same company,8 while two years later, it targeted multiple U.S. executive 
branch agencies after the Trump administration pulled out of the nuclear 
arrangement with that nation.9  
Despite its general technological backwardness, North Korea also has 
acquired offensive cyber capacity. It famously hacked Sony Entertainment 
in 2014 in response to the imminent release of a film that mocked its leader; 
the operation destroyed data, rendered computers inoperable and exposed 
employee emails.10 Since then, the country has mounted an active campaign 
of hostile cyber operations, typically designed to steal funds by hacking into 
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financial institutions and digital currency exchanges.11 However, its most sig-
nificant operation was the 2017 WannaCry attacks that infected hundreds of 
thousands of computers in over 150 countries, including those of the United 
Kingdom’s National Health Service.12  
Although China has been less aggressive than its neighbor in terms of 
security-related offensive cyber operations, it regularly uses cyber means to 
steal commercial and governmental intellectual property.13 The country also 
conducted the 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management hack that com-
promised a background investigation database containing 21.5 million rec-
ords.14 Despite a non-binding 2015 agreement between Presidents Obama 
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and Xi, Chinese commercial cyber espionage does not appear to have dimin-
ished.15 
The coin is, however, two-sided. The United States and its allies are ac-
tive competitors in this cyber struggle. In June 2019, the United States re-
portedly engaged in cyber operations to disable Iranian computer systems 
used to plan attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf.16 The previous year, 
it blocked access to the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg, which 
was behind Russia’s 2016 U.S. elections meddling, to “thwart attempts to 
interfere” with the mid-term elections.17 Of course, the United States and 
Israel are said to have been behind the most well-known physically destruc-
tive cyber operation, Operation Olympic Games, which employed the Stux-
net malware to target the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz between 2006 and 
2010.18  
Facing these and many other hostile cyber operations, States are crafting 
responsive strategies, tactics and rules of engagement.19 One of the major 
challenges in doing so is that key aspects of the international law governing 
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cyber responses are vague, unsettled or complex. To take a well-known ex-
ample, States may, pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary 
international law, respond using armed force, including by cyber means, to 
an “armed attack” by another State.20 But the law remains unsettled as to 
whether a cyber operation not manifesting physically, like one that dramati-
cally disrupts the functioning of a State’s government or economy, opens the 
door to a response employing force.21 
Not surprisingly, therefore, international law is markedly absent from, 
for instance, the U.S. Defense Department’s 2018 Cyber Strategy,22 2018 
U.S. Cyber Command Vision,23 China’s 2019 National Defense White Pa-
per24 and the 2019 speech on cyber conflict by General Valery Gerasimov at 
the Russian Academy of Military Science.25 Rather, strategies and operational 
concepts tend to take on a practical “tit-for-tat” feel.26 This is only natural, 
for in the face of normative uncertainty, operators and policymakers logically 
view “in-kind” responses as “fair play”—whether their operations occur in 
anticipation of another State’s hostile cyber operations or in reaction to 
them. For them, an “in-kind” response would appear to shift the legal risk 
of escalation to the rival. After all, responding in-kind surely must be lawful, 
notwithstanding any challenges in discerning the precise legal character of 
the initial hostile cyber operation.  
Testing that sense, this article examines the legal context surrounding in-
kind responses to cyber operations conducted by, or otherwise attributable, 
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to a State.27 As used here, “in-kind” refers to a cyber operation at about the 
same level of severity as the hostile cyber operation to which it replies. In 
international law, such comparisons are often made in terms of “scale and 
effects.”28 By this approach, the effects of an in-kind response are of the 
same general nature—in the sense of disruption/denial of services, loss of 
functionality, physical damage or injury, etc.—as the cyber operation to 
which it responds, although, as explained below, the response need not be 
limited to the same type of target. Moreover, the scale (degree and extent) of 
harm caused by an in-kind response is “roughly equivalent” to that resulting 
from the initial hostile cyber operation.  
For instance, consider a denial-of-service (DoS) operation attributable to 
one State directed at a financial network in another that causes severe eco-
nomic consequences. The “in-kind” response by the “injured” State does 
not have to be a DoS operation disrupting financial activities in the “respon-
sible” State.29 It could, for example, consist of a DoS operation directed at 
the manufacturing capability of the responsible State, so long as the eco-
nomic and other consequences thereof are not excessive relative to the im-
pact of the financial network operation.  
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From a legal perspective, in-kind responses often do minimize the risk 
of running afoul of international law, and, resultantly, potential negative con-
sequences of engaging in unlawful cyber operations that range from interna-
tional condemnation to liability for reparations. This is so even in the face of 
uncertainty regarding the precise parameters of the applicable international 
law rules.  
Yet, international law does not always permit States to respond in-kind 
to hostile cyber operations. And the fact that various aspects of the law gov-
erning responses are unsettled renders the immediate resort to in-kind re-
sponses especially problematic. To tease loose the nuance, this article serially 
considers the four basic legal categories of hostile cyber operations that are 
conducted by one State against another—armed attacks, uses of force not 
rising to the level of an armed attack, other internationally wrongful acts and 
lawful acts—in the context of in-kind responses. With regard to each, the 
analysis will be bifurcated into situations in which there is certainty that the 
operation qualifies as falling within the respective category and those in 
which inclusion therein is legally ambiguous. The objective is greater contex-
tual precision when evaluating in-kind cyber responses and, thereby, a less-
ening of the legal risk States face when engaging in them. 
 
II. ARMED ATTACK 
 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides, “[n]othing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Se-
curity Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.”30 This provision, which reflects customary international law, 
is one of two exceptions to the prohibition on the “threat or use of force” 
found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and customary law—the other be-
ing Security Council authorization under Chapter VII.31   
The right of self-defense is clearly applicable in cyberspace, both in the 
sense of using force to repel an armed attack that is conducted by cyber 
means and responding with cyber capabilities at the use of force level to an 
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armed attack.32 Whether consisting of cyber or non-cyber measures, the for-
cible response is subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality.33 
Necessity denotes a situation in which the victim State must use force in 
order to prevent the armed attack, should it be imminent, or defeat it if the 
attack is underway. Whereas necessity is about whether force needs to be 
used in self-defense at all, the requirement of proportionality limits the de-
gree of force employed to that required to effectively defeat the imminent or 
ongoing armed attack.  
Although a cyber operation unquestionably might constitute an armed 
attack,34 uncertainty can surface when determining whether a particular cyber 
operation qualifies as such. According to the prevailing view, all cyber armed 
attacks under Article 51 are necessarily “uses of force” under Article 2(4), 
but not all uses of force rise to the level of an “armed attack.”35 In this regard, 
the International Court of Justice distinguished “the most grave forms of the 
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave 
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forms” in its Nicaragua judgment.36 The Court pointed to an operation’s 
“scale and effects” as the measure by which to distinguish the two stand-
ards.37 According to this view, a cyber operation could qualify as a prohibited 
use of force under Article 2(4), but not generate consequences of sufficient 
scale and effects to accord the target State a right to respond forcibly by 
cyber or non-cyber means.38  
Unfortunately, there is no bright line test in law for determining whether 
the scale and effects of a cyber operation are significant enough to qualify as 
the “most grave” form of a use of force. The U.S. view, one that is unique 
among States, is that no gap exists between the use of force and armed attack 
thresholds.39 The United States accordingly reserves the right to respond to 
all cyber operations reaching the use of force threshold with force of its own, 
both cyber and non-cyber.  
Regardless of this debate, no State has disputed the characterization of 
hostile cyber operations that cause significant physical damage, destruction or 
death as armed attacks.40 For example, one that triggers a nuclear plant melt-
down or opens a dam’s gates above a densely populated area causing wide-
spread death and destruction would certainly be characterized as an armed 
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of course proportionate. 
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attack.41 Few States have taken any position as to when a cyber operation 
causing either a lesser degree of damage or injury, or harm that includes nei-
ther, qualifies as an armed attack.42 The most robust position is that of 
France. 
  
A cyberattack could be categorised as an armed attack if it caused substan-
tial loss of life or considerable physical or economic damage. That would be 
the case of an operation in cyberspace that caused a failure of critical infra-
structure with significant consequences or consequences liable to paralyse whole 
swathes of the country’s activity, trigger technological or ecological disasters and 
claim numerous victims.43 
 
Until a sufficient number of other States speak to the issue, the threshold at 
which a cyber operation may be characterized as an armed attack will remain 
ill-defined.  
When it is clear that the initial hostile cyber operation is an armed attack, 
the “in-kind” response often will be lawful, but only if the situation is such 
that the victim State cannot put an end to the cyber armed attack unless it 
responds at that level of severity. If it can respond with a lesser degree of 
cyber or kinetic force, or even cyber or non-cyber measures not rising to the 
level of force, it would be limited to doing so by virtue of the principles of 
proportionality or necessity respectively.44 Additionally, caution is merited, 
for what is unambiguously an armed attack for the United States because the 
cyber operation has crossed the use of force threshold, may not be seen as 
such by other States; this poses particular risk of condemnation for Ameri-
can in-kind response operations. 
Nevertheless, because most hostile cyber operations do not result in sig-
nificant physical damage or death, and because the precise threshold for 
qualifying damage or death is uncertain for those that do, consensus on the 
characterization of a particular cyber operation as an armed attack may prove 
elusive in all but cases at the extreme. This being so, a victim State assumes 
a fair degree of legal risk in choosing to respond in-kind on the basis of self-
                                                                                                                      
41. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 33, § l.16.3. 
42. The Netherlands has noted, “At present there is no international consensus on 
qualifying a cyberattack as an armed attack if it does not cause fatalities, physical damage or 
destruction yet nevertheless has very serious non-material consequences.” NETHERLANDS, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 9. 
43. FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 40, § 1.2.1 (emphasis added). 
44. Conversely, victim States may also not want to limit themselves to an “in-kind” 











defense, not only with regard to context-dependent application of the prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality, but more directly by being seen as 
having used force to respond to a hostile operation that qualifies as a use of 
force, but not an armed attack, and therefore not subject to a forcible re-
sponse.  
 
III.  USE OF FORCE THAT IS NOT AN ARMED ATTACK 
 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides, “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”45 As with determining 
whether a cyber operation constitutes an armed attack, a cyber operation of 
scale and effects comparable to non-cyber uses of force is undeniably a use 
of force under Article 2(4).46 There is broad consensus, therefore, that at 
                                                                                                                      
45. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
46. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 69; Paul C. Ney, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. 




In assessing whether a particular cyber operation—conducted by or against the United 
States—constitutes a use of force, DoD lawyers consider whether the operation causes 
physical injury or damage that would be considered a use of force if caused solely by tradi-
tional means like a missile or a mine. 
 
For a discussion of the remarks, see Michael Schmitt, The Defense Department’s Measured Take 
on International Law in Cyberspace, Just Security (Mar. 11, 2020) https://www.justsecu-
rity.org/69119/the-defense-departments-measured-take-on-international-law-in-cyber-
space/; Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, United Kingdom, Cyber and International Law 
in the 21st Century, Chatham House (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century  
 
If a hostile state interferes with the operation of one of our nuclear reactors, resulting in 
widespread loss of life, the fact that the act is carried out by way of a cyber operation does 
not prevent it from being viewed as an unlawful use of force or an armed attack against us. 
If it would be a breach of international law to bomb an air traffic control tower with the 
effect of downing civilian aircraft, then it will be a breach of international law to use a hostile 
cyber operation to disable air traffic control systems which results in the same, ultimately 
lethal, effects. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT 
STRATEGY, ANNEX A: SUPPLEMENT TO AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE APPLICATION OF 











least a cyber operation that injures or kills people, or physically damages or 
destroys objects beyond a de minimis level, amounts to a use of force.47  
Should a State conclude that the hostile cyber operation to which it wants 
to respond is a use of force but not an armed attack, as in the case of evident, 
but not significant damage, it may not respond in-kind on the basis of self-
defense; only armed attacks or Security Council authorization under Chapter 
VII allow for a forcible response, whether cyber or non-cyber in character. 
As noted, though, by the U.S. “no gap” position, an in-kind response would 
generally be lawful, so long as the conditions of necessity and proportionality 
are satisfied, because for the United States all uses of force are armed attacks. 
It merits noting that Judge Bruno Simma, in his separate opinion in the 
International Court of Justice’s Oil Platforms case, suggested that proportion-
ate “forcible countermeasures” might be lawful in response to hostile uses 
of force not reaching the armed attack threshold.48 In the law of State re-
sponsibility, countermeasures are acts that would be unlawful but for the fact 
that they are taken in order to cause another State to desist in its own unlaw-
ful acts against the injured State or to secure reparations for any harm caused 
thereby from the responsible State.49 So long as they are proportionate and 
comply with a number of other conditions discussed below, countermeas-
ures are clearly a lawful response to an unlawful use of force by another State.  
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility 
purport to exclude the use of force as a countermeasure.50 But by the Simma 
                                                                                                                      
https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engage-
ment-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html [hereinafter AUS-
TRALIA 2019 SUPPLEMENT] (“Australia reaffirms that the United Nations (UN) Charter ap-
plies in its entirety to state actions in cyberspace, including the prohibition on the use of 
force (Article 2(4).”); NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 3 
  
The government believes that cyber operations can fall within the scope of the prohibition 
of the use of force, particularly when the effects of the operation are comparable to those 
of a conventional act of violence covered by the prohibition. In other words, the effects of 
the operation determine whether the prohibition applies, not the manner in which those 
effects are achieved.  
 
FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 40, § 1.1.2 (“A cyberoperation carried out 
by one State against another State violates the prohibition of the use of force if its effects 
are similar to those that result from the use of conventional weapons.”). 
47. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 334.  
48. Oil Platforms, supra note 33, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, ¶¶ 12-13. 
49. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 27, arts. 22, 49; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, 
supra note 20, r. 21. 











approach, an in-kind forcible cyber response could be viewed as a “defensive 
military action ‘short of’ full-scale self-defense,” assuming it complies with 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality, criteria drawn from the 
law of self-defense.51  
No State has publicly endorsed Simma’s suggestion that a use of force 
might be an available response option below the armed attack level. On the 
contrary, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, France, the Nether-
lands, and Finland, inter alia, recently have dismissed the possibility of forci-
ble countermeasures in the cyber context.52 Thus, any attempt to justify an 
in-kind response to what is clearly a use of cyber force, but one that falls 
short of the armed attack level, on the basis that it is a forcible countermeas-
ure will almost certainly be met with international opprobrium. 
Below the injurious or physically destructive level of harm, uncertainty 
as to when a cyber operation constitutes a use of force abounds.53 After all, 
in that almost all States view armed attacks as only the “most grave forms” 
of the use of force, the leeway to characterize non-injurious and non-de-
structive cyber operations as a use of force is significantly greater vis-à-vis 
the use of force threshold than is the case for such armed attacks. States that 
have taken the stance that cyber operations need not cause physical damage, 
destruction, injury or death to amount to a use of force, like France,54 tend 
                                                                                                                      
51. Oil Platforms supra note 33, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, ¶ 12. The condition 
of necessity encompasses the requirements of imminency with respect to anticipatory self-
defense and immediacy vis-à-vis responses occurring after the armed attack. 
52. For the U.S. view, Ney, supra note 46; for the UK view, Wright, supra note 46; 
AUSTRALIA 2019 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 46; FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra 
note 40, § 1.1.3; NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 7; FIN-
LAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE: FIN-
LAND’S NATIONAL POSITIONS, at 5 (Oct. 15, 2020), https://um.fi/docu-
ments/35732/0/KyberkannatPDF_EN.pdf/12bbbbde-623b-9f86-b254-07d5af3c6d85? 
t=1603097522727. 
53. Schmitt, Use of Cyber Force, supra note 32, at 1111–16. 
54. FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 40, § 1.1.2 
 
In the absence of physical damage, a cyberoperation may be deemed a use of force against 
the yardstick of several criteria, including the circumstances prevailing at the time of the 
operation, such as the origin of the operation and the nature of the instigator (military or 
not), the extent of intrusion, the actual or intended effects of the operation or the nature of 












to adopt the approach proposed in Tallinn Manual 2.0, which considers an 
array of non-exclusive factors, such as severity, directness and invasiveness, 
in making the determination.55 However, most States have yet to express a 
position, preferring instead to assess each cyber incident individually, as 
NATO members have agreed to do.56  
This lack of a bright line threshold for the use of force in cyberspace 
carries with it significant legal risk. Consider the case in which the targeted 
State does not consider an adversary’s cyber operation to be a use of force, 
but rather a violation of another rule of international law. It, therefore, be-
lieves it is entitled to respond in-kind as a countermeasure. However, if other 
States or adjudicative bodies characterize the initiating cyber operation as a 
use of force, the in-kind response would be as well. Since countermeasures 
may not be forcible, the response would be seen as unlawful by those States 
or bodies.  
 
IV.  INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT  
(OTHER THAN A USE OF FORCE) 
 
As observed by the International Law Commission in its Articles on State 
Responsibility, a cyber operation that 1) is attributable to a State and 2) 
breaches an international obligation amounts to “an internationally wrongful 
                                                                                                                      
The Netherlands has suggested as much, but not taken the position definitively. NETHER-
LANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 4 (“In the view of the govern-
ment, at this time it cannot be ruled out that a cyber operation with a very serious financial 
or economic impact may qualify as the use of force.”). 
Finland has simply opined that the question of whether “a cyber attack producing sig-
nificant economic effects such as the collapse of a Ste’s financial system or parts of its econ-
omy should be equated to an armed attack…merits further consideration.” FINLAND, MIN-
ISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 6. 
55. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 333–37; FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE AR-
MIES, supra note 28, § 1.1.2.; NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 
28, at 4.  
Paul Ney, U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel, however, seems to suggest 
physical damage is required. Ney, supra note 46 
 
In assessing whether a particular cyber operation—conducted by or against the United 
States—constitutes a use of force, DoD lawyers consider whether the operation causes phys-
ical injury or damage that would be considered a use of force if caused solely by traditional 
means like a missile or a mine. (emphasis added). 
 
See also Koh, supra note 39, at 3–4.  











act.”57 The key, albeit not sole, grounds for satisfaction of the first element 
are that the hostile cyber operation was conducted either by the organs of a 
State or by persons or groups acting upon the instructions, or under the di-
rection or control, of one.58 The second element is satisfied by a State’s fail-
ure to fulfill an international law obligation owed to another State, whether 
found in treaty or customary law.59 While the requirement encompasses all 
international law obligations, the ones likeliest to be breached by a hostile 
cyber operation are respect for the sovereignty of other States and non-in-
tervention into their internal or external affairs. Therefore, they are also the 
primary rules of international law most likely to be implicated by an in-kind 
response. 
Sovereignty is a cardinal principle of international law,60 albeit a some-
what contentious one.61 For instance, the United Kingdom takes the position 
that it is not a rule of international law at all, although no other State has 
adopted that stance and a number have expressly rejected it.62 Finland has 
explained its rejection of the so-called “principle but not a rule approach.” 
                                                                                                                      
57. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 27, art. 2. 
58. Id., arts. 4, 8. 
59. Id., art. 12; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 14. 
60. See Island of Palmas (Neth. v US) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (where 
the distinguished arbiter and jurist Max Huber observed, “[s]overeignty in the relations be-
tween States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the 
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”); see 
also OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 169 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th 
ed. 2008); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 1. 
61. Compare Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 207 (suggesting that sovereignty is not a 
primary rule of international law), with Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyber-
space: Lex Lata Vel Non?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 213 
(arguing actions that reach a threshold degree of infringement on the territorial integrity of 
another State, as well as those which constitute an interference with or usurpation of inher-
ently governmental functions, necessarily violate the rule of sovereignty and are internation-
ally wrongful acts). 
62. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 46 (“The UK Government’s position is therefore that 
there is no such rule as a matter of current international law.”); but see FRANCE, MINISTRY 
OF THE ARMIES, supra note 40, § 1.1.1 (“The principle of sovereignty applies to cyberspace. 
France exercises its sovereignty over the information systems located on its territory. The 
gravity of a breach of sovereignty will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.”); NETHERLANDS, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 2 
 
According to some countries and legal scholars, the sovereignty principle does not consti-
tute an independently binding rule of international law that is separate from the other rules 












The argument has been raised recently that no legal consequences could be 
attached to sovereignty as a general principle, at least for the purposes of 
cyber activities. It is not only difficult to reconcile such an idea with the 
established status of the rule prohibiting violations of sovereignty in inter-
national law, but it also gives rise to policy concerns. Agreeing that a hostile 
cyber operation below the threshold of prohibited intervention cannot 
amount to an internationally wrongful act would leave such operations un-
regulated and deprive the target State of an important opportunity to claim 
its rights.63 
 
Assuming it is a rule, which is the better view, a State’s sovereignty can 
be violated through the remote causation of certain effects on another State’s 
territory. Unfortunately, only France and Finland have proffered their view 
on the requisite type of effects that trigger such a breach. According to 
France,  
 
Any cyberattack against French digital systems or any effects produced on 
French territory by digital means by a State organ, a person or an entity 
exercising elements of governmental authority or by a person or persons 
acting on the instructions of or under the direction or control of a State 
constitutes a breach of sovereignty.64  
 
And Finland has taken the position that,  
 
                                                                                                                      
sovereignty of other countries is an obligation in its own right, the violation of which may 
in turn constitute an internationally wrongful act. 
 
Ney, supra note 46 (“The implications of sovereignty for cyberspace are complex, and we 
continue to study this issue and how State practice evolves in this area, even if it does not 
appear that there exists a rule that all infringements on sovereignty in cyberspace necessarily 
involve violations of international law.”); see also Switzerland, Austria and the Czech Repub-
lic, Open-ended Working group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of international security - Second Substantive Session, U.N. WEB TV (Feb. 10–14, 2020), 
http://webtv.un.org/search/3rd-meeting-open-ended-working-group-on-developments-
in-the-field-of-information-and-telecommunications-in-the-context-of-international-secu-
rity-second-substantive-session; see also FINLAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra 
note 52, at 1–3;  
On sovereignty, see Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS 
LAW REVIEW 1639 (2017). 
63. FINLAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 3. 











[i]n addition to material harm that may be caused by such an operation, 
other relevant considerations include whether an intrusion in the cyber in-
frastructure triggers a loss of functionality of the equipment relying on it, 
or modifies or deletes information belonging to the target State, or to pri-
vate actors in its territory.65  
 
Unfortunately, the views of other States remain elusive. 
Sovereignty may also be violated through interference with, or usurpa-
tion of, an inherently governmental function, as in the case of manipulating 
election returns or conducting remote law enforcement searches abroad 
without the consent of the territorial State concerned.66 Like the violation on 
the basis of territoriality, the precise parameters of such interference or usur-
pation remain murky.67 
The obligation of non-intervention is likewise less than fully developed 
in the cyber context. Prohibited intervention has two elements. First, the 
activity must be coercive in the sense of causing the targeted State to engage 
in conduct in which it would otherwise not engage or to refrain from activi-
ties it would otherwise carry out. It must deprive the State of choice. Second, 
the cyber operation must be coercive with respect to the target State’s inter-
nal or external affairs, the so-called domaine réservé.68  
While the rule undeniably applies to cyber operations,69 few States have 
taken an official position on which cyber activities would amount to inter-
vention, especially for cyber operations having effects lying below the inju-
rious or physically destructive level of harm.70 Challenges in application in-
clude distinguishing cyber operations that are coercive from those that 
                                                                                                                      
65. FINLAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 2. 
66. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 22–23. 
67. NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRs, supra note 28, at 3 
 
In general, the government endorses Rule 4, proposed by the drafters of the Tallinn Manual 
2.0, on establishing the boundaries of sovereignty in cyberspace. Under this rule, a violation 
of sovereignty is deemed to occur if there is 1) infringement upon the target State’s territo-
rial integrity; and 2) there has been an interference with or usurpation of inherently govern-
mental functions of another state. The precise interpretation of these factors is a matter of 
debate. 
 
68. Nicaragua, supra note 28, ¶¶ 202, 205; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 66.  
69. See, e.g., 2015 U.N. GGE Report, supra note 32, ¶¶ 26, 28(b); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, 
supra note 20, r. 66. 












merely influence the target State’s choices and determining which activi-
ties—beyond obvious examples like conducting elections and law enforce-
ment—lie within the target State’s domaine réservé.71 
                                                                                                                      
[T]he practical application of the principle in this context would be the use by a hostile state 
of cyber operations to manipulate the electoral system to alter the results of an election in 
another state, intervention in the fundamental operation of Parliament, or in the stability of 
our financial system.  
 
FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 40, § 1.1.1 (“Interference by digital means 
in the internal or external affairs of France, i.e. interference which causes or may cause harm 
to France’s political, economic, social and cultural system, may constitute a violation of the 
principle of non-intervention.”); AUSTRALIA, 2019 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 46 
 
A prohibited intervention is one that interferes by coercive means (in the sense that they 
effectively deprive another state of the ability to control, decide upon or govern matters of 
an inherently sovereign nature), either directly or indirectly, in matters that a state is permit-
ted by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely. Such matters include a state’s eco-
nomic, political, and social systems, and foreign policy. 
 
Ney, supra note 46 
 
For example, “a cyber operation by a State that interferes with another country’s ability to 
hold an election” or that tampers with “another country’s election results would be a clear 
violation of the rule of non-intervention.” Other States have indicated that they would view 
operations that disrupt the fundamental operation of a legislative body or that would desta-
bilize their financial system as prohibited interventions.  
 
71. Nicaragua, supra note 28, ¶¶ 202, 205; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 66; 
NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 28, at 3 
 
The precise definition of coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention, has not yet fully 
crystallised in international law. In essence it means compelling a state to take a course of 
action (whether an act or an omission) that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The 
goal of the intervention must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state. 
 
FINLAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 3 
 
The requirement of coercion leaves out lesser forms of influence and persuasion that are 
commonplace in international relations. The limitation to sovereign affairs – such as a 
State’s political, economic or cultural system or the direction of its foreign policy12 – further 
distinguishes prohibited intervention from measures, the purpose of which is to compel 
another State to comply with its international obligations. 
 
On the relationship between sovereignty and intervention, see Harriet Moynihan, The Appli-
cation of International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention, CHATHAM HOUSE 












States targeted by unlawful cyber operations may respond with counter-
measures, that is, responses that would be unlawful but for the fact that their 
status as countermeasures “precludes their wrongfulness.”72 It is essential to 
understand that the wrongfulness of such responses is only precluded when 
the original cyber operation constitutes an internationally wrongful act. This 
raises the problem of uncertainty as to the precise parameters of sovereignty, 
intervention and other rules that the initial hostile cyber operation might vi-
olate. If that operation is subsequently judged not to have violated interna-
tional law, the response thereto cannot qualify as a countermeasure and, 
thus, there would be no basis for precluding wrongfulness; the response will 
have been unlawful. In-kind responses mitigate this risk to a degree. 
Consider a hostile cyber operation by State A against State B. State A 
believes the operation is lawful because the effects caused do not reach the 
level at which State A believes a violation of sovereignty occurs. State B, 
however, interprets the threshold of breach differently and characterizes its 
response in-kind as a countermeasure in response to a violation of its sover-
eignty. Despite the disagreement, State B is on firm ground. If State A’s hos-
tile cyber operation is an internationally wrongful act, a response in-kind, 
subject to other requirements discussed below, qualifies as a countermeas-
ure, thereby precluding the wrongfulness of State B’s penetration of State’s 
A’s sovereignty.  
On the other hand, if the hostile cyber operation by State A is not a 
violation of international law, neither is a response in-kind likely to be un-
lawful; therefore, there would be no wrongfulness with respect to the re-
sponse for qualification as a countermeasure to preclude (but see the discus-
sion in the next section). The in-kind response instead would amount to an 
act of “retorsion”—an unfriendly but lawful act—by State B.  
Precisely the same dynamic would operate, for instance, with respect to 
hostile cyber operations and responses between States that differ over 
whether sovereignty is even a rule of international law or where the threshold 
for coerciveness lies vis-à-vis prohibited intervention. As this example illus-
trates, an in-kind response can sometimes operate to limit the legal risk as-
sociated with legal uncertainty.  
                                                                                                                      
72. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 27, arts. 49–54; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, 











The in-kind response must comply with certain conditions to do so.73 In 
particular, the countermeasure may only be conducted to induce the respon-
sible State to cease its hostile cyber operations (which may include actions 
that shut down the hostile operation itself) or to secure any reparations from 
the responsible State that may be due.74 This mens rea requirement means that 
an in-kind response by the injured State that is primarily motivated by re-
venge or a desire to punish would be unlawful, as would one unlikely to cause 
the responsible State to desist or provide reparations, or both.  
A countermeasure must also be proportionate in the sense that it has to 
be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity 
of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.”75 A response 
in-kind is likely to cause roughly equivalent harm and implicate the same 
international law rule as the hostile cyber operation. This being so, in-kind 
responses will normally satisfy the requirement of proportionality. They are 
certainly less likely to be construed as disproportionate by other States than 
one that is not in-kind.  
In this regard, note that international law does not limit an injured State 
to in-kind countermeasures against the source of the hostile operations. So 
long as requirements like proportionality are met, countermeasures may be 
directed at cyberinfrastructure other than that used to conduct the hostile 
operation. Indeed, cyber countermeasures may be conducted in response to 
a non-cyber internationally wrongful act (and vice versa), and they need not 
implicate the same legal rights as did the responsible State’s hostile cyber 
operation. 
Nevertheless, in-kind responses are best situated to comply with the re-
quirement of proportionality. This is because it is difficult to compare dis-
similar types of harm to discern whether that caused by a countermeasure is 
proportionate to the harm generated by the initial internationally wrongful 
act. For instance, how is one to compare the effects of a hostile cyber oper-
ation that causes a loss of functionality of a government agency’s cyberinfra-
                                                                                                                      
73. The requirements of notice and the temporal limitations are not discussed here as 
they do not affect the legal status of an in-kind response. Articles on State Responsibility 
supra note 27, art. 52; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, ch. 4, sect. 2. 
74. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 27, art. 49; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra 
note 20, r. 21. 
75. Proportionality in the context of countermeasures must be distinguished from self-
defense proportionality, which refers to the degree of force required for a State to defend 
itself effectively against an armed attack. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 27, art. 











structure to a purported cyber countermeasure directed at private cyberinfra-
structure? The harm caused by the former is likely to be assessed in terms of 
disruption of government service, whereas the latter’s harm probably will be 
measured financially. And with respect to the rights involved, there is no 
hierarchy of significance for international law rights. To illustrate, is a viola-
tion of sovereignty or the prohibition on intervention of greater significance 
in a situation in which the hostile cyber operation violated the former, 
whereas the response implicated the latter? As a practical matter, in-kind re-
sponses mitigate the risk that other States might not agree with the State 
taking the countermeasure as to these facets of proportionality. 
Finally, and as noted earlier, if a hostile cyber operation qualifies as a use 
of force—or risks being characterized as such by other States—the fact that 
the operation also violated other primary obligations such as respect for sov-
ereignty or non-intervention does not open the door to a response in-kind 
on the basis of qualification as a countermeasure. According to the Articles 
on State Responsibility, a countermeasure “shall not effect…[t]he obligation 
to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations.”76 Of course, the injured State could respond with non-for-
cible countermeasures that are proportionate to the hostile cyber operation, 
with proportionality assessed based on all the various breaches that opera-
tion represented. But since the internationally wrongful act that initiated the 
exchange included the use of force, in-kind responses are off the table. 
 
V. LAWFUL ACT 
 
Many hostile cyber operations, however, do not violate international law 
standing alone, that is without causing the consequences discussed above 
that qualify them as an internationally wrongful act. Examples include espi-
onage—whether targeting governmental or private data—and other intelli-
gence and counterintelligence cyber operations,77 as well as most infor-
mation or disinformation campaigns conducted by cyber means.78 In these 
situations, injured States wanting to respond may be inclined to do so in-
kind believing their response will be similarly unregulated under international 
                                                                                                                      
76. Articles on State Responsibility supra note 27, art. 50(1)(a) and ¶ 5 of commentary; 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 22.  
77. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 32 (mere characterization of a cyber oper-
ation as espionage, intelligence or as a counterintelligence activity does not alone violate 
international law.).   











law. In fact, if the initial hostile cyber operation does not violate international 
law, a response in-kind in most situations would likely be deemed retorsion, 
which is “‘unfriendly’ conduct that is not inconsistent with any international 
obligation of the State engaging in it.” 79  
In-kind responses in such situations are not without legal risk. Recall that 
as the term “in-kind” is used herein, the response need not be directed at the 
cyberinfrastructure that is being used to conduct the initial hostile cyber op-
eration; rather, the qualifying characteristics for in-kind responses are sever-
ity of effects and the nature of the operation. This reflects a sense of opera-
tional reality, as a responding State might have valid operational reasons to 
respond against other cyberinfrastructure located within the responsible 
State. For instance, a State targeted by a temporary DoS cyber operation that 
is not unlawful may elect to respond by means of a similar DoS operation, 
although against cyber assets that are more vulnerable than those being used 
to mount the hostile operation. Or the responding State might assess that 
the consequences of a response against other than the cyberinfrastructure 
used to conduct the hostile operation are more likely to convince the other 
State to desist. The response could even be intended to signal the risks asso-
ciated with continuing to mount hostile, albeit not unlawful, operations as a 
form of deterrence. 
These cases merit particular caution. As explained above, a cyber opera-
tion that interferes with, or usurps, another State’s inherently governmental 
functions violates that State’s sovereignty, even if it does not cause effects 
that violate sovereignty on the basis of territoriality.80 Similarly, a cyber op-
eration constitutes wrongful intervention when it coercively affects the tar-
geted State’s internal or external affairs. There is no requirement of physical 
effects so long as the target State is deprived of choice with regard to its 
domaine réservé.81  
Consider the following scenario. State A’s cyber agency is conducting 
remote commercial espionage targeting key companies in State B. The cyber 
operations, although unfriendly and in violation of State B’s domestic law, 
are not internationally wrongful acts. Espionage per se does not violate inter-
national law; the operations are not causing effects on State B’s territory or 
interfering with its inherently governmental functions in a manner that vio-
lates State B’s sovereignty; State A is not coercing State B with respect to 
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policies and practices within its domaine réservé; and there are no consequences 
that rise to the level of a use of force.  
Since State A’s cyber agency’s infrastructure is hardened, State B decides 
to retaliate by launching intermittent DoS operations targeting State A’s dig-
ital voting systems, which are being used in its regional elections, to harass 
State A. The response would be unlawful, even though it is an in-kind re-
sponse—a DoS operation of no greater severity—to State A’s hostile but 
lawful cyber operations. It is 1) interfering with the inherently governmental 
function of running elections and 2) coercively affecting State A’s domaine 
réservé of selecting its government (choice of political system) by blocking 
voting. State B’s response would be internationally wrongful on the basis of, 
respectively, violating sovereignty and engaging in coercive intervention.  
The response cannot be justified as a countermeasure because there is 
no underlying internationally wrongful act to which it responds—and even 
if there was, retaliation is not a legitimate basis for taking countermeasures. 
Paradoxically, since the response would be unlawful, it would arguably open 
the door to countermeasures by State A. Thus, State B’s response would risk 
escalation because State A would now be entitled to engage in cyber or non-
cyber actions against State B that would otherwise be unlawful, so long as 
State A’s operations were designed to compel State B to desist. And State B 
could not respond in-kind to them because State A’s operations are a lawful 
countermeasure, and therefore there is no wrongfulness to open the door to 
a State B countermeasure.  
The lesson of this cautionary tale is clear. A State targeted by hostile but 
lawful (under international law) cyber operations must ensure that its in-kind 
response does not inadvertently trip over a primary rule of international law. 
In particular, States seeking to limit legal risk should carefully consider the 
nature of the target at which its in-kind response is directed. They should 
avoid targeting cyberinfrastructure of the type that would affect the respon-
sible State’s performance of inherently governmental functions, such as con-
ducting elections, collecting taxes, engaging in law enforcement, conducting 
judicial proceedings or providing other services to the population that only 
governments provide. Similarly, operations targeting cyber infrastructure 
that are designed to compel that State to engage in, or refrain from, conduct 
or choice as to its domaine réservé would be an unlawful in-kind response to a 
hostile but lawful initial cyber operation mounted by that State. As noted, 
there would be a risk of escalation and the responding State would be in a 












The one situation in which it would usually be lawful to respond in-kind 
against targets in either of the two, high-risk categories is when the respond-
ing State directs its response at the same category of target that was the sub-
ject of the hostile cyber operation that initiated the exchange. It may be un-
clear whether the initial operation is unlawful, for instance because of uncer-
tainty as to whether it rises to the level of interference with respect to a sov-
ereignty violation or coercion vis-à-vis intervention. However, so long as the 
response against cyber infrastructure linked to an inherently governmental 
function or affecting the domaine réservé is of an equivalent scale and effects, 
it is likely lawful. On the one hand, if the initial hostile cyber operation turns 
out to be viewed as lawful because its effects do not qualify it as a violation 
of sovereignty or intervention, the response would be an act of retorsion. 
On the other, if the initial hostile cyber operation is later deemed to be an 
internationally wrongful act other than a use of force (see discussion above), 
the targeted State’s in-kind response would qualify as a lawful in-kind coun-
termeasure.  
This illustrates an important dynamic with respect to uncertainty. When 
it is unclear whether a cyber operation directed against cyberinfrastructure in 
a State is an internationally wrongful act, a response that is of the same scale 
and effects against the same type of cyberinfrastructure will usually be lawful, 
unless, as explained earlier, it is at the use of force level. It will either qualify 
as retorsion or a countermeasure. It is crucial to emphasize that counter-
measures must be proportionate and therefore the harm caused to the State 
launching the initial unlawful operation should be of the same scale.  
There is an important exception to these broad conclusions. States must 
be mindful of the primary purpose of their in-kind response. Acts of retor-
sion are permissible for any reason because they are, by definition, lawful. 
However, a retaliatory primary motive is not permitted if the operation is 
going to be justified on the basis that it is a countermeasure, an act based on 
the plea of necessity or a self-defense operation.82 Their sole justifiable pur-
poses are to put an end to the unlawful operation and secure reparations, 
remedy a grave and imminent peril to an essential interest of the responding 
State, and defeat the armed attack, respectively. While a State may have more 
than one reason to respond against another State’s hostile cyber operations, 
an in-kind response that itself would otherwise be unlawful is only justified 
if its primary purpose is permissible. 
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Thus, if a State retaliates in-kind as a form of punishment or retaliation 
against another State’s hostile cyber operation that it believes did not violate 
international law, but that operation is later considered by other States or 
adjudicative bodies to be internationally wrongful, the in-kind retaliatory 
measure likewise would be characterized by those States or bodies as unlaw-
ful on the basis of purpose. And if a targeted State believes that the initial 
hostile cyber operation against it was unlawful, it would have no basis for 
responding in order to punish or retaliate in the first place. This is so even 
in the case of an archetypal in-kind response.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
At first blush, States may view an in-kind response as the best option for 
countering hostile cyber operations, especially where the legal nature of 
those operations is opaque. This conclusion derives not only from the belief 
that an in-kind response will likely convince the responsible State to cease its 
hostile activity and effectively deter future hostile conduct, but also that its 
in-kind nature minimizes the risk of contravening international legal norms. 
Yet, while there are many situations in which an in-kind cyber response 
would minimize legal risk, international law does not always permit States to 
respond in-kind. Moreover, uncertainty as to the interpretation of numerous 
rules of international law will sometimes make doing so legally risky.  
This cautionary note is, however, not a call for inaction in the face of 
hostile cyber operations by or attributable to other States. On the contrary, 
we believe proportionate responses are necessary to effectively deter such 
destabilizing operations, even in the face of challenges in discerning their 
precise legal character. Indeed, it is State practice, combined with statements 
by States as to their interpretation of international law rules in the cyber con-
text, that will add clarity to much of the uncertainty that makes certain in-
kind responses legally precarious. But when States consider in-kind re-
sponses, as they naturally will in many situations, they must carefully examine 
the options on a case-by-case basis and conduct a sophisticated legal risk 
assessment. Doing so will enhance their prospects for defeating hostile cyber 
operations and deterring future malicious activity by adversaries.  
 
